Russia’s government is intensifying its campaign against anti-war dissent just weeks before parliamentary elections. Tactics include using criminal prosecutions, censorship, and electoral restrictions to prevent opposition to the war in Ukraine from developing into an organized political movement. The imprisonment of veteran opposition politician Lev Shlosberg has become one of the clearest examples of how far the Kremlin is prepared to go to silence critics as Russians prepare to elect a new State Duma on September 20.

Shlosberg, 63, is a senior figure in the liberal Yabloko party and has opposed Russian military intervention in Ukraine for years. Authorities arrested him in June 2025 after he described the war as a game of ‘bloody chess’ and called for peace. On August 17, 2026, a court in Pskov sentenced him to 11 years and one month in a penal colony, finding him guilty of spreading allegedly false information about the military and other offenses.

Shlosberg’s imprisonment is part of a much larger system of repression created since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Laws against ‘false information’ about the military can carry sentences of as much as 15 years, while provisions against ‘discrediting’ the armed forces have been used against social-media posts, demonstrations, and other expressions of opposition. In Shlosberg’s case, he was arrested and imprisoned for posting an article on social media site Telegram calling for an end to the war in Ukraine.

According to Human Rights Watch at least 1,299 people had faced criminal prosecution for opposing the war in the past year, with hundreds imprisoned. Authorities have also expanded the use of ‘foreign agent,’ ‘extremist,’ and ‘undesirable organization’ designations, blocked independent websites, restricted messaging services, and VPN tools, and prosecuted some government opponents who have fled abroad.

The Kremlin is simultaneously narrowing voters’ political choices. Russia’s Supreme Court has barred Yabloko, the country’s only legally registered openly anti-war party, from competing in September’s parliamentary election. Anti-war politician Boris Nadezhdin was also designated a foreign agent, prevented from running and subsequently fled Russia. These actions make it increasingly difficult for dissatisfaction with the war to translate into electoral opposition.

That strategy could still carry political costs. A July Levada Center survey found that support for Russian military operations had fallen to 66 percent in Russia, while almost two-thirds of respondents favored moving toward peace negotiations. The figures do not necessarily mean Russians oppose Putin or favor concessions to Ukraine, but they suggest increasing fatigue with a conflict approaching its fifth year.

That the Kremlin feels it must arrest ordinary Russians and Russian elected officials simply for opposing the war is one indication of how badly things are going for Russia in Ukraine. Such arrests also however inadvertently draw attention both to those who have anti-war sentiments and what exactly those sentiments are. For example, Shlosberg used his trial to call the war a catastrophe for Russia and advocate an immediate ceasefire.

The Kremlin can prevent anti-war Russians from organizing, appearing on television, or competing effectively in elections, but repression cannot necessarily eliminate their dissatisfaction. By removing peaceful political outlets, Moscow risks convincing more Russians that elections cannot change government policy.

The September vote is likely to demonstrate the Kremlin’s continued political control, but it may also reveal a growing divide between the appearance of public unity and the quieter war weariness developing underneath it.